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Affordable Housing: Plenty of Demand, But No Supply 
to Be Found 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
  Over the past decade, access to affordable housing1 has become 
an increasingly important issue for those individuals lower on the 
socioeconomic spectrum.2  The 2008 financial crisis and ensuing 
recession led to significant reductions in construction of new housing, 
especially housing suitable for low- and moderate-income households.3  
As a result, demand for housing that low- and moderate-income 
Americans can actually afford has significantly outpaced supply, 
resulting in rising home and rent prices nationwide.4   
With the 2020 Presidential election looming, the American 
housing market has become an area of intense political focus, and 
affordable housing is now a key part of the Democratic party platform.5  
Several prominent Democratic politicians proposed plans to increase 
access to affordable housing among the most vulnerable and underserved 
groups.6  Two commonly proposed solutions are: (1) down payment 
assistance programs for low- and moderate-income7 households and (2) 
 
 1. Housing is generally considered affordable when total monthly housing expense does 
not exceed 30% of total monthly household income.  CHRISTOPHER HERBERT ET AL., JOINT 
CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., MEASURING HOUSING AFFORDABILITY: 
ASSESSING THE 30 PERCENT OF INCOME STANDARD 2 (2018), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_Herbert_Hermann_McCue_
measuring_housing_affordability.pdf [https://perma.cc/MV3M-RZSE]. 
 2. SUSAN K. URAHN & TRAVIS PLUNKETT, PEW CHARITABLE TRS., AMERICAN FAMILIES 
FACE A GROWING RENT BURDEN 4 (2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-
/media/assets/2018/04/rent-burden_report_v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/P59U-J5QT]. 
 3. MARK ZANDI, MOODY’S ANALYTICS, ADDRESSING THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS 
1 (2018), https://www.economy.com/getlocal?q=867546e8-545c-4f78-b1c5-
7fd90908dc6d&app=eccafile [https://perma.cc/MZ3J-PXQN]. 
 4. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2 (describing the increased demand for rental 
properties as the primary driver behind higher rent prices). 
 5. See generally Jacob Passy, Where the 2020 Presidential Candidates, Including 
Elizabeth Warren and Bernie Sanders, Stand on Affordable Housing, MKT. WATCH (Sept. 19, 
2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-where-2020-presidential-candidates-
including-elizabeth-warren-and-kamala-harris-stand-on-affordable-housing-2019-07-25 
[https://perma.cc/HV4S-WU8F] (summarizing candidates’ affordable housing proposals). 
 6. See id. (summarizing candidates’ affordable housing proposals). 
 7. Income categories are expressed in terms of area median income (AMI): low-income 
is less than 80% of AMI, moderate-income is between 80% and 120% of AMI, and high-
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competitive grant programs tied to reform of local land-use regulations.8  
These proposals seek to impact the housing market in opposing ways:  
down payment assistance would shift existing rental demand to home 
purchases,9 while competitive grant programs aim to boost housing 
development, both for rental and owner occupancy, by simplifying 
zoning restrictions and lowering development costs.10 
This Note examines these two proposals designed to address 
housing affordability and improve economic opportunity for low- and 
moderate-income Americans in light of the housing market’s current state 
and the historical developments that led to it.  Part II details the pre-crisis 
developments that led to peak homeownership in 2006, the post-financial 
crisis developments in the national housing market, and the insufficient 
supply of affordable housing today.11  Part III discusses current proposals 
for down payment assistance and competitive grant programs tied to land-
use restriction reduction.12  Part IV analyzes the practicality of both 
proposals given costs and existing regulatory constraints.13  Part V 
evaluates the relative advantages and disadvantages of each and 
recommends implementation of policies like the competitive grant 
proposals that target housing supply rather than demand.14 
 
income is greater than 120% of AMI.  Archana Pradhan, Expiration of the CFPB’s Qualified 
Mortgage “GSE Patch” – Part 3, CORELOGIC: INSIGHTS BLOG fig.2 (July 26, 2019), 
https://www.corelogic.com/blog/2019/07/expiration-of-the-cfpbs-qualified-mortgage-gse-
patch-part-3.aspx [https://perma.cc/96W9-T4GR]. 
 8. See generally Passy, supra note 5 (summarizing candidates’ affordable housing 
proposals). 
 9. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 8 (discussing the impact of slower rates of 
conversion from renting to homeownership on the increase in rent prices). 
 10. See Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Address at The Urban 
Institute: Barriers to Shared Growth: The Case of Land Use Regulation and Economic Rents 
2 (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20151120_barriers_share
d_growth_land_use_regulation_and_economic_rents.pdf [https://perma.cc/S47Y-TQZS] 
(describing zoning and land-use restrictions as a supply constraint). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. Pre-Crisis Credit Expansion 
An economic catastrophe on the scale of the 2008 financial crisis 
and subsequent recession never truly has a single cause, but most 
acknowledge the collapse of the early 2000s housing bubble as the 
primary catalyst of the crisis.15  Over the decades leading up to the 
financial crisis, innovative financial products16 and legislative changes17 
led to a dramatic expansion of credit.18  This put homeownership within 
reach for more Americans than ever before and fundamentally changed 
the housing market, culminating in record homeownership rates19 and 
home prices.20 
Historically, federal policy has promoted homeownership,21 
which many consider key to the “American Dream.”22  Indeed, the federal 
government dutifully created the infrastructure for the modern mortgage 
market to help maximize homeownership in the United States.23  
 
 15. See Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Transformation of Mortgage Finance and 
the Industrial Roots of the Mortgage Meltdown 5 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t, 
Working Paper No. 133-12, 2012), https://www.irle.berkeley.edu/files/2012/The-
Transformation-of-Mortgage-Finance-and-the-Industrial-Roots-of-the-Mortgage-
Meltdown.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V8Q-WDX6] [hereinafter Transformation of Mortgage 
Finance] (listing the fall in housing prices and rise in foreclosures as the cause of the financial 
crisis). 
 16. For instance, securitization transactions became an integral part of the expansion of 
the subprime mortgage market, beginning in the 1990s and even spanning beyond the 2008 
financial crisis.  See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
REPORT 68 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ZEP-EBR4] (describing expansion of mortgage securitizations in the 
1990s to include subprime loans). 
 17. See, e.g., Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (“EHFA”) § 201, 12 U.S.C. § 1717 
(2018) (permitting Fannie Mae to purchase mortgages without federal insurance); id. § 305, 
12 U.S.C. § 1454 (permitting Freddie Mac to purchase mortgages without federal insurance). 
 18. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 83 (describing the expansion of credit 
in early 2000s to households previously unable to access it). 
 19. Id. at 9 (listing unprecedented credit expansion as a driving force behind the 
increasing rate of homeownership, which peaked in 2004). 
 20. See id. at 214 (describing the 2006 peak of the American housing market). 
 21. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 163(h)(3) (2018) (authorizing deduction of qualified residential 
mortgage interest to be deducted from a homeowner’s taxable income). 
 22. See Andrea J. Boyack, Equitably Housing (Almost) Half a Nation of Renters, 65 
BUFF. L. REV. 109, 110 (2017) (describing need for rent-friendly policy alternatives to typical 
“American Dream of homeownership” based policies). 
 23. See Neil Fligstein & Adam Goldstein, The Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization 
Crisis 13–14 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t, Working Paper No. 200-10, 2010), 
https://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2010/The-Anatomy-of-the-Mortgage-Securitization-Crisis.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YX66-PUJR] [hereinafter Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis] 
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Congress established the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(“Fannie Mae”) in 1938,24 the Government National Mortgage 
Association (“Ginnie Mae”) in 1968,25 and finally the Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) in 1970.26  These entities 
encouraged the growth of mortgage lending throughout the late-1900s by 
purchasing mortgages from originators and creating a secondary market 
for the loans, thereby providing originators with more funds for further 
lending.27  Ginnie Mae is wholly owned by the federal government and 
operates as part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development.28  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are private corporations,29 but their federal 
charters provide that both “have an affirmative obligation to facilitate the 
financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income 
families.”30  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac receive governmental backing 
through lines of credit from the U.S. Treasury, tax exemptions, and 
payment clearing services.31  Additionally, securities issued by both 
entities receive preferential capital treatment under banking regulations,32 
which incentivizes financial institutions to purchase them and ensures 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac low borrowing costs to finance their 
 
(describing the Johnson administration’s focus on increasing homeownership and its efforts 
to stimulate the housing market). 
 24. Fannie Mae was chartered as a federal agency in 1938 to help facilitate the purchase 
and sale of federally insured mortgages.  Erica Santos, Recent Development, VIII. Fannie 
Mae & Freddie Mac: Release from Conservatorship, 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 92, 92 
(2016).  Fannie Mae was subsequently privatized in 1968 but retained government 
sponsorship.  Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 (“HUDA”) § 801, 12 U.S.C. § 
1716b (2018). 
 25. HUDA § 801, 12 U.S.C. § 1716b. 
 26. Freddie Mac was created in 1970 to purchase home mortgages from both federal 
agencies and private financial institutions.  Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 (“EHFA”) 
§ 305, 12 U.S.C. § 1454 (2018). 
 27. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 38. 
 28. Ginnie Mae, operating under the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
works to promote homeownership and facility liquidity in the mortgage market by 
guaranteeing principal and interest payments from mortgage-backed securities comprised of 
eligible loans to make these securities more attractive to investors.  Julia Kagan, Government 
National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), INVESTOPEDIA (May 5, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/ginniemae.asp [https://perma.cc/XW5J-752M]. 
 29. Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime Crisis and Financial Regulation: International and 
Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 581, 595 (2010). 
 30. 12 U.S.C. § 4501(7) (2018). 
 31. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 39. 
 32. 12 C.F.R. § 167.6(a)(1) (2019) (assigning a 20% risk weight to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac issued securities, including mortgage-backed securities, and a 50% risk weight 
to private label MBS for the purpose of financial institutions calculating their capital under 
existing requirements). 
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mortgage purchases.33  Due to this hybrid structure, where both entities 
are privately owned yet have public obligations and receive substantial 
government support, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considered 
government-sponsored entities (“GSEs”).34 
Originally, Fannie Mae only purchased home mortgages insured 
by federal agencies, such as the Federal Housing Administration 
(“FHA”).35  The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 authorized both 
GSEs to purchase mortgages that lacked federal insurance.36  The GSEs’ 
purchases expanded to “conforming mortgages,” which are uninsured, 
fixed-rate mortgages in compliance with their respective underwriting 
and size guidelines.37  The GSEs earned profit for their private owners by 
holding purchased mortgages in their portfolios to collect interest and 
principal payments or by selling loans to other investors.38  Instead of 
selling individual mortgages, the GSEs collected large pools of 
mortgages, issued “mortgage-backed securities” (“MBS”), and sold 
pieces to investors, who collected a share of principal and interest 
payments generated by the underlying loans.39  Further regulatory 
changes, such as the imposition of more stringent capital requirements on 
savings and loan associations during the 1980s,40 encouraged lenders to 
sell more of their conforming mortgages to the GSEs, who in turn 
packaged and issued greater numbers of MBS.41  The GSEs’ ability to 
purchase and securitize these massive amounts of mortgages was aided 
in large part by their comparatively lenient loss reserve requirements: 
0.45% of guaranteed MBS and 2.5% of portfolio mortgages, compared to 
the 4% of portfolio mortgages required for thrifts.42 
 
 33. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 39. 
 34. See Dam, supra note 29, at 594–95 (describing governmental support provided to 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which allows the entities to borrow at low interest rates). 
 35. Santos, supra note 24. 
 36. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 37. Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 17. 
 38. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 38–39. 
 39. Id. at 39. 
 40. See, e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(“FIRREA”), Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101, 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (stating in Section 101(2) 
that one purpose of the bill is “[t]o improve the supervision of savings associations by 
strengthening capital . . . and other supervisory standards”). 
 41. Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 15–16 (explaining 
that savings and loan associations sold greater numbers of portfolio mortgages in order to 
meet new capital requirements). 
 42. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 39. 
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While the GSEs dominated securitization of conforming 
mortgages, private institutions, such as commercial and investment 
banks, spearheaded securitization of adjustable-rate mortgages and other 
nonconforming mortgages43 the GSEs could not purchase.44  These 
“private label” securities45 frequently included riskier nonconforming 
and nonprime mortgages made to less creditworthy borrowers, who in 
return paid higher interest rates on their debt.46  Like a GSE MBS, private 
label MBS contain multiple “tranches” with different payment priorities, 
where “senior” tranches receive principal and interest payments first, 
before payments flow down to more “junior” tranches.47  In the event that 
cash flows from the underlying mortgages are insufficient to satisfy all 
obligations—due to pre-payments or delinquencies—investors in junior 
tranches experience a default before the senior tranches that enjoy greater 
insulation.48  To compensate for the different degrees of credit risk, each 
tranche carries a different interest rate, with junior tranches paying higher 
interest rates than more senior tranches.49  Private label MBS appealed to 
many investors by allowing them to purchase the tranche that met their 
risk tolerance and providing higher returns than securities with similar 
risk profiles.50   
As they lacked the same implicit government guarantee and 
included less creditworthy, nonprime mortgages, private label MBS were 
considered riskier than those issued by the GSEs.51  However, investors 
could partially mitigate credit risk by purchasing a credit default swap 
(“CDS”), which functioned like an insurance policy on the private label 
 
 43. Nonconforming mortgages are ineligible for purchase and securitization by the GSEs 
because they fail to meet minimum down payment, minimum borrower credit score, 
maximum size, or other underwriting requirements.  Julia Kagan, Nonconforming Mortgage, 
INVESTOPEDIA (June 13, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/non_conforming.asp 
[https://perma.cc/9V8F-HMTD]. 
 44. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16. 
 45. Private label MBS are securitized pools of mortgages packaged by private issuers and 
are not issued or guaranteed by the GSEs.  Id. at 105. 
 46. Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 17 (describing the riskier 
nature of private label mortgage backed securities and the higher returns they paid due to 
lower credit quality of their underlying loans). 
 47. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 43. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 27 (describing pre-crisis 
perception that the high rates paid by AAA rated tranches of private label MBS made them 
one of the best investments available). 
 51. See id. at 16–17 (describing the perception that GSE MBS had the implicit backing 
of the federal government and were safer investments as a result). 
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MBS.52  The CDS buyer paid periodic premiums, expressed as a 
percentage of the security’s value, to the seller in exchange for the 
promise to receive the face value of the underlying security in the event 
of a covered default, effectively shifting credit risk to the CDS seller.53  
Private label securities also offered higher returns than the low-rate GSE 
securities, which made them attractive to many investors.54  More MBS 
investors entered the private label market after origination of conforming 
mortgages dropped roughly 50% in 2004 from their 2003 peak, while 
issuance of GSE MBS that contained these mortgages dropped even more 
substantially.55  As demand for private label MBS grew, lenders 
expanded originations of riskier, nonconforming mortgages they sold to 
banks for securitization.56  Nonconforming mortgage origination grew 
rapidly, from 30% of all overall mortgage lending between 1990 and 
2003, to 70% in 2006.57  More than $1 trillion of nonconforming 
mortgages were securitized in both 2005 and 2006, up from just $100 
billion in 2001,58 and the value of private label MBS issuances exceeded 
that of GSE MBS.59   
Securitization expanded mortgage credit to less creditworthy 
borrowers, who were especially vulnerable to an economic downturn.60  
Home prices peaked in April 2006, and from that point sales slowed.61  
Early default rates of nonconforming mortgages accelerated during 
200662 and unsold home inventory rose further.63  Unemployment 
 
 52. See Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 23–24 
(describing how a CDS allowed investors to insure the securities they held). 
 53. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 50. 
 54. Id. at 43. 
 55. Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 25 (comparing the 
roughly to $2.6 trillion of conforming mortgages originated in 2003 compared just $1.35 
trillion originated in 2004). 
 56. See Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 23–24 (describing the 
substantial increase in nonconforming mortgage origination during the early 2000s). 
 57. Id. at 24. 
 58. Id. 
 59. SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT. ASS’N, US MORTGAGE-RELATED ISSUANCE AND 
OUTSTANDING tbl.2.1 (2019), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/sf-us-
mortgage-related-sifma.xls [https://perma.cc/8RZG-HSDJ] (stating that $1.26 and $1.28 
trillion of non-agency/private label MBS were issued in 2005 and 2006 respectively compared 
with $995.6 and $903.7 billion of agency MBS in the same years). 
 60. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 389 (“As the housing bubble 
deflated, families that had counted on rising housing values for cash and retirement security 
became anchored to mortgages that exceeded the declining value of their homes.”). 
 61. Id. at 214. 
 62. Transformation of Mortgage Finance, supra note 15, at 35. 
 63. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 233. 
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skyrocketed, and the United States officially entered a recession in late 
2007.64  The nation’s economic woes caused a sharp increase in the 
number of homeowners who either abandoned their homes65 or defaulted 
on their mortgages, leading to foreclosure.66   Many homeowners found 
their mortgages “underwater” and owed more on their mortgages than 
their homes were worth, which led some to voluntarily turn their homes 
over to their mortgage lender.67  By 2008, the serious delinquency rates 
jumped for all types of mortgages68 and put significant financial pressure 
on MBS issuers, who retained pieces of the securities.69  Ultimately, the 
resulting strain forced the GSEs into conservatorship70 and led to massive 
losses and even the failures of some private label MBS issuers.71  As 
unsold inventory continued to increase, the housing bubble finally 
popped, sending home prices tumbling across the country.72  Excess 
supply made new residential construction unprofitable for builders and 
development virtually ground to a stop.73   
B.  Current Housing Dynamics 
In comparison to low- and moderate-income households, high-
income households were not impacted as severely by the recessionary 
deflation in home prices, largely because home equity makes up a smaller 
 
 64. Id. at 390. 
 65. Many homeowners that lost their jobs during the financial crisis found themselves 
unable to make their mortgage payments or sell the properties due to the drop in value.  Before 
defaulting outright, some homeowners turned over the properties directly to their lenders.  Id. 
at 389. 
 66. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 8 (stating that eight to ten million homes 
were foreclosed on during the recession and that less than a third of those households are 
expected to own homes again). 
 67. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 404 (“Many mortgage holders 
find themselves underwater; that is, owing more than their homes are worth.”). 
 68. Id. at 218 fig.11.2. 
 69. See Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 30–31 
(describing how, as mortgage default rates grew, the value of MBS held by financial 
institutions decreased). 
 70. Santos, supra note 24, at 97. 
 71. Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis, supra note 23, at 30–31. 
 72. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 214–15 (describing the peak of 
housing prices in 2006, the fall in sales rate, the subsequent increase in housing stock for sale, 
and finally, the drop in prices). 
 73. See ZANDI, supra note 3 (“Homebuilding collapsed during the housing crash a decade 
ago and has been slow to recover.”). 
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percentage of their overall net worth.74  High-income households on 
average derive larger portions of their net worth from equity investments 
than their low- and moderate-income counterparts, and on the back of the 
post-crisis stock market rally, wealthier households recovered much more 
quickly than others.75  As a result, demand for higher-cost housing 
increased and made construction viable again fairly quickly.76  The post-
crisis recovery reached low- and moderate-income households much 
later, and until recently, potential profits from construction of new, lower-
cost housing for rent and owner occupancy were insufficient to induce 
developers to invest in these units.77 
Over the past decade, developers focused on construction of high-
cost housing and produced fewer affordable housing units than in the 
past.78  Since 2013, completions of large homes marketed to high-income 
households outpaced smaller, more affordable homes.79  Conversely, 
with significantly more low- and moderate-income households than high-
income households nationwide,80 demand for affordable housing 
consistently outstrips the meager increases in supply, resulting in 
nationwide shortages.81  The overall homeownership rate among 
Americans has also decreased significantly, dropping from an overall 
high of 69% in 200482 to 64.4% in 2018.83  While homeowners still 
outnumber renters, the number of renter households increased at roughly 
 
 74. Moritz Kuhn et al., Research: How the Financial Crisis Drastically Increased Wealth 
Inequality in the U.S., HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 13, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/09/research-
how-the-financial-crisis-drastically-increased-wealth-inequality-in-the-u-s 
[https://perma.cc/ZW8P-AVTJ]. 
 75. Id. 
 76. ZANDI, supra note 3 (discussing the post-crisis recovery among higher-income 
households). 
 77. Id. (describing the more the recent recovery from the 2008 financial crisis for low- 
and moderate-income households). 
 78. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S 
HOUSING 2019, at 8 (2019), 
https://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Hous
ing_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G6A-GLRT] (“[S]mall homes under 1,800 square feet 
represented just 22 percent of single-family completions, down from 32 percent on average 
in 1999–2011.”). 
 79. Id. (stating the completion rate of homes with more than 3000 square feet first 
outpaced that of homes with less than 1800 square feet in 2013 and the trend has continued 
through 2018). 
 80. See id. at 40 (showing in 2017, roughly 48.1 million households had incomes of 
$75,000 or more while more than 62% of households had incomes of less than $75,000). 
 81. ZANDI, supra note 3. 
 82. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2. 
 83. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 2. 
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double the rate of home owners between 2001 and 2017.84  This shift 
toward renting has carried across demographic and income divides.85  In 
the post-crisis era, households are transitioning from renting to 
homeownership at significantly lower rates than before the financial 
crisis, with only 13% of renter households transitioning to 
homeownership between 2009 and 2015, compared to 20% between 2001 
and 2005.86   
Some observers cite changing preferences among younger 
households as a significant driver behind the increase in renting at the 
expense of homeownership; however, research suggests the majority of 
younger renters, aged eighteen to thirty-four, aspire to homeownership 
but feel that it is beyond their financial reach.87  The inability to qualify 
for a mortgage or afford rising home prices forces many younger 
households to rent rather than buy.88  While Americans between the ages 
of eighteen and thirty-four still make up the single largest age group of 
renters, those over the age of fifty-five fuel new demand for rentals even 
further.89 
The increased number of households relying on renting versus 
owning, coupled with insufficient construction of housing to meet this 
new demand, resulted in a nationwide increase in rent prices.90  Indeed, 
the number of rental units available for under $800 per month decreased 
by roughly 4 million between 2011 and 2017, a 17% drop.91  As of 2018, 
units renting for less than $850 made up only 4% of all those in new 
unsubsidized multifamily buildings, while those renting for less than 
 
 84. See id. at 40 (detailing an 18.5% increase in renters from 2001 to 2017 compared to 
a 9.71% increase in homeowners over the same period). 
 85. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2 (analyzing increased rental participation 
among eighteen to thirty-five and fifty-five plus age groups); JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES 
OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 25 (stating that more than 25% of households with 
annual incomes of at least $75,000 rented housing in 2018 compared with only 19% in 2008). 
 86. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2. 
 87. Id. (describing results of a 2016 Pew Research Center public in which 57% of renters 
aged eighteen to thirty-four expressed the desire to own a home but were unable to qualify for 
mortgage financing). 
 88. See id. (stating that 57% of renters aged eighteen to thirty-four reported being unable 
to qualify for a mortgage). 
 89. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 25 
(describing the increase in households over the age of fifty-five as renters, which, as of 2018, 
make up over 25% of all renters compared to eighteen to thirty-four year old renters, which 
make up 38%). 
 90. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 4 (“The steadily rising demand for rental 
properties over the past decade has reduced vacancy rates to near historic lows, fueling a rapid 
increase in rental market prices that has outpaced household incomes for many families.”). 
 91. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 29. 
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$1050 made up just 9% of the total.92  According to the Joint Center for 
Housing Studies of Harvard University, analysts generally consider 
housing costs of 30% or less of income “affordable,” and classify those 
spending more than 30% monthly as “cost-burdened.”93  As of 2018, the 
median annual income for renter households was only $40,530,94 making 
$1013 the cost-burden threshold for the median income renter 
household.95 
Higher rent prices drive the significant increases in the proportion 
of cost-burdened renters nationwide.96  Cost-burdened renters face a 
significantly bleaker financial situation than their non-burdened 
counterparts, with the median value of savings among cost-burdened 
renters at roughly $10, while that of non-burdened renters is over 
$1000.97  Cost burden has long been prevalent among the lowest income 
households, but with higher rent prices, larger numbers of moderate-
income households also became cost-burdened in recent years.98  In 2017, 
nearly half of all renter households were cost-burdened.99  With steady 
increases in net new renter households projected for the near future and 
residential construction consistently lagging demand, rent prices are 
likely to increase further.100   
Along with the price of rent, average home prices also increased 
significantly nationwide to rival the pre-crisis peak.101  As the nation 
emerged from recession, property values recovered more quickly than 
 
 92. Id. at 29–30. 
 93. HERBERT ET AL., supra note 1. 
 94. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 26. 
 95. See id. (listing the 2018 median annual income of renter households as $40,530); 
HERBERT ET AL., supra note 1 (providing 30% of monthly income as a proxy for housing 
affordability, multiplied this figure by $40,530 to calculate the cost burden threshold for a 
median income renter). 
 96. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 4 (describing the approximate 19% increase 
in the number of cost-burdened rental households between 2001 and 2015). 
 97. Id. at 13–14 (describing the median value of savings among cost-burdened and non-
cost-burdened renters as of 2015). 
 98. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 4 (listing a 
4.6% increase in cost burden among renter households with incomes of $30,000 to $44,999 
and a 2.9% increase among those with incomes of $45,000 to $74,999 between 2011 and 
2017). 
 99. Id. (stating that “47.4 percent of renter households remained cost-burdened”). 
 100. See id. at 3 (“[E]stimates show an uptick in early 2019, in keeping with Joint Center 
projections of about 400,000 net new renter households annually over the coming decade.”). 
 101. Id. at 2 (stating that the FHFA Home Price Index was just 2% below its 2006 high at 
the end of 2018). 
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incomes.102  The ratio of median home price to median household 
income, a common measure of housing affordability and an indicator of 
the difficulty to save for a down payment, rose from its 2011 low of 3.3 
to 4.1 in 2018.103  While this data suggests that increasing home prices 
make housing less affordable to the median-income American, cost 
burden among homeowners decreased by 8% between 2010 and 2017.104  
These two seemingly conflicting facts suggest that recent home purchases 
are primarily attributable to higher-income households, as fewer 
purchasers spend more than 30% of their income on monthly payments 
for these high-cost properties.105 
III.  PROPOSALS 
Ahead of the forthcoming election in November 2020, affordable 
housing has become an increasingly politically charged issue.106  
Prominent Democratic politicians, including Senators Elizabeth Warren, 
Kamala Harris, and Cory Booker, proposed plans designed to improve 
access to affordable housing.107  Two common schemes to boost housing 
affordability are (1) down payment assistance programs108 to aid low- and 
moderate-income households in purchasing homes, and (2) competitive 
grant programs109 designed to ease local land-use restrictions, decrease 
 
 102. See id. (stating that the ratio of median home price to median household income 
increased from a low of 3.3 in 2011 to 4.1 in 2018). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 4. 
 105. See id. (describing the decreasing rate of cost-burdened homeowners); id. at 2 (stating 
that the FHFA Home Price Index was just 2% below its 2006 high at the end of 2018). 
 106. See Matthew Yglesias, America’s Dual Housing Crisis and What Democrats Plan to 
Do About It, Explained, VOX (July 30, 2019, 8:50 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/2019/7/30/20681101/housing-crisis-democrats-2020-warren-harris-
booker-castro [https://perma.cc/74FJ-7RDP] (describing affordable housing proposals of 
several Democratic candidates and their criticisms of existing policy); Team Warren, My 
Housing Plan for America, MEDIUM (Mar. 16, 2019), https://medium.com/@teamwarren/my-
housing-plan-for-america-20038e19dc26 [https://perma.cc/K9UM-6K42] (describing 
Senator Warren’s various affordable housing proposals). 
 107. Yglesias, supra note 106. 
 108. Down payment assistance programs were selected for analysis because they reflect 
the pre-crisis policy of promoting homeownership over renting. 
 109. Competitive grant programs were chosen for analysis because of bipartisan support 
for streamlining land-use and zoning restrictions to make new construction more cost-efficient 
and affordable. 
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construction costs, and spur construction of additional rental and owner 
occupancy housing.110 
A. Down Payment Assistance  
Both before and after the financial crisis, American housing 
policy has sought to make housing more affordable and increase 
household wealth by boosting homeownership.111  Senators Warren and 
Harris both announced plans to increase access to affordable housing by 
promoting homeownership among demographic groups with low 
homeownership rates.112  These plans seek to facilitate low- and 
moderate-income renter households purchasing homes by subsidizing a 
portion of the down payment on a home113 and targeting minority 
households living in “redlined communities.”114  “Redlining” is the 
practice of financial institutions declining to lend to individual or 
commercial borrowers in particular neighborhoods based on their 
location rather than a borrower’s credit profile.115  While redlining has 
long been a concern,116 there is renewed emphasis on countering it as the 
number of Americans living below the poverty line increases.117  These 
poor Americans are increasingly confined to specific neighborhoods 
disproportionately inhabited by certain minority groups, namely African-
Americans and Hispanics.118 
 
 110. See Yglesias, supra note 106 (discussing Senators Booker’s and Warren’s respective 
proposals for competitive grant programs); Team Warren, supra note 106 (describing a down 
payment assistance proposal). 
 111. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 88 (discussing access to 
mortgages and home equity as a “powerful stabilizing force” for households in times of 
economic distress in the pre-crisis era). 
 112. See Team Warren, supra note 106 (discussing Senator Warren’s down payment 
subsidy proposal); David Siders, Kamala Harris Proposes $100 Billion Plan for Black 
Homeownership, POLITICO (July 6, 2019, 1:42 PM), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/06/kamala-harris-homeownership-2020-1399253 
[https://perma.cc/ZQ4P-99N2] (discussing Senator Harris’s $100 billion down payment 
subsidy program). 
 113. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
 114. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 72. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. (explaining the aim of combating redlining as a major goal of the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977). 
 117. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 16 (“Fully 70 
percent of poor blacks and 63 percent of poor Hispanics live in high-poverty neighborhoods, 
compared with just 35 percent of poor whites and 40 percent of poor Asians.”). 
 118. Id. 
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The underlying interest behind promoting increased 
homeownership is the long-held belief that homeownership naturally 
leads to increased household wealth by building home equity, the single 
largest source of wealth for the majority of Americans.119  On average, 
minority households are much less likely to own a home than White 
households,120 and correspondingly, tend to have less household 
wealth.121  Through the subsidization of down payments, proponents aim 
to fuel conversion of cost-burdened, minority renters into homeowners, 
with the hope that increased wealth and prosperity will follow.122  
Down payment assistance programs could also bring the ancillary 
benefit of reducing the cost of rent.123  Conversion of renters to 
homeowners provides a natural check on increasing rental demand, and 
thereby, on rent prices as well.124  In the years after the financial crisis, 
renters converted to homeowners at lower rates than before it.125  This 
slower conversion, along with a general decrease in homeownership, led 
to imbalances in the supply and demand of rental housing, which 
translated to higher average rent prices.126  By facilitating increased 
conversion to homeownership, down payment assistance programs could 
move some existing demand out of the rental market into the home 
 
 119. Michael Calhoun, Lessons from The Financial Crisis: The Central Importance of a 




 120. Laurie Goodman et al., A Closer Look at the Fifteen-Year Drop in Black 
Homeownership, URBAN INST.: URBAN WIRE (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.urban.org/urban-
wire/closer-look-fifteen-year-drop-black-homeownership [https://perma.cc/BU8A-7VBZ] 
(listing 2016 rates of homeownership among White, African American, and Hispanic 
households as 71.3%, 41%, and 45.6%, respectively). 
 121. See Calhoun, supra note 119 (citing average wealth of African American and 
Hispanic families as less than 15% and 20% respectively of that of the average White family). 
 122. See, e.g., Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, KAMALA HARRIS FOR THE 
PEOPLE, https://kamalaharris.org/policies/homeownership-gap/full-policy/ 
[https://perma.cc/KNP9-WETC] (last visited Sept. 16, 2019) (arguing that equal 
homeownership rates among African American and White households would decrease the 
racial wealth gap by 31%). 
 123. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 7 (arguing that increased home purchases 
expand available supply of rental housing and causes rent prices to drop). 
 124. See id. (“If the supply of homes for sale can meet or exceed the demand by potential 
buyers, experts would expect rental supply to increase and rents to decline.”). 
 125. Id. at 8. 
 126. Id. at 7. 
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purchase market, potentially easing rent prices with more available 
supply.127 
These programs would be available to low- and moderate-income 
households seeking to purchase a primary residence.128  Those meeting 
requisite income thresholds, less than $100,000 to $125,000 under 
Senator Harris’s plan129 or less than 120% of area-median income under 
Senator Warren’s,130 would be eligible for direct grants to help defray the 
cost of a down payment.131  The amount of assistance granted would vary 
on a case-by-case basis and would provide some accommodation for the 
dynamics of local housing markets, but would be capped at 
predetermined percentages of the value of the property to be purchased— 
3.5%132 and 20%133 under Warren’s and Harris’s proposals 
respectively.134       
Senators Warren and Harris cite minority homeownership as a 
central goal of their proposed down payment assistance programs.135  
However, these programs would provide subsidies to households of all 
racial and ethnic backgrounds, provided they meet certain 
requirements.136  Both proposals require a minimum residence period, 
either current or previous, in a low-income or minority-dominated 
 
 127. See id. (“If the supply of homes for sale can meet or exceed the demand by potential 
buyers, experts would expect rental supply to increase and rents to decline.”). 
 128. American Housing Economic and Mobility Act (“AHEMA”), S. 787, 116th Cong. § 
201(b)(1) (2019); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122. 
 129. Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122 (listing the maximum 
annual household incomes as $100,000, or $125,000 in high-cost areas, to qualify for down 
payment assistance under Senator Harris’s plan). 
 130. AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(b)(1)(B) (listing the maximum annual household income 
eligible for down payment subsidy under Senator Warren’s plan as 120% of area median 
income). 
 131. See id. § 201(d) (providing the maximum amount of down payment assistance under 
Senator Warren’s proposal); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122 
(stating that, under Senator Harris’s proposal, the funds provided could be used to make a 
down payment and pay closing costs). 
 132. AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(d). 
 133. Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122. 
 134. Compare AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(d) (listing the maximum value of grants provided 
under Senator Warren’s as 3.5% of the appraised value of the property), with Combatting the 
Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122 (stating that grants under Senator Harris’s plan 
must be no more $25,000 or 20% of total loan value including closing costs). 
 135. AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(a)(8); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra 
note 122. 
 136. AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(a)(8); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra 
note 122. 
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community with a history of racially segregated zoning137 or redlining.138  
Neither plan would prevent prospective recipients from receiving aid 
based on their race or ethnicity, but by making community residence a 
prerequisite, certain minority groups would have disproportionate 
eligibility in comparison to other ethnicities.139  Recipients would not be 
restricted to purchasing a home in these communities and could instead 
use their subsidies to purchase a home in the neighborhood of their 
choosing.140 
B. Competitive Grant Programs 
Another common proposal is to confront the affordable housing 
shortage through federal grants designed to increase the supply of units 
available for affordable housing.141  The existing supply of affordable 
housing has been under consistent downward pressure, and the small 
amounts of new development have not been enough to offset this trend, 
resulting in consistent net decreases of affordable housing units in recent 
years.142  The supply of low-rent housing units is likely to continue to 
decline naturally due to the high proportion of these units in older 
buildings nearing the end of their useful lives.143  The proportion of low-
cost rentals in older buildings increased over the past decade, and by 
2017, 43% of rentals priced below $800 per month were in buildings at 
least fifty years old.144   
Recent development of rental housing units has heavily targeted 
higher-income renters and largely ignored both low- and moderate-
 
 137. See, e.g., AHEMA, S. 787 § 201(g)(1)(B) (listing low-income communities with 
historically segregated zoning codes as eligible). 
 138. Id. § 201(a)(7); id. § 201(g)(1)(B); Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, 
supra note 122. 
 139. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 16 (“Fully 
70 percent of poor blacks and 63 percent of poor Hispanics live in high-poverty 
neighborhoods, compared with just 35 percent of poor whites and 40 percent of poor 
Asians.”). 
 140. See, e.g., AHEMA, S. 787 § 101 (proposing the creation of a competitive grant 
program tied to streamlining of land-use and zoning restrictions). 
 141. See, e.g., Team Warren, supra note 106 (describing Senator Warren’s proposal for 
grant funding to municipalities aimed at increasing new construction of affordable housing). 
 142. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 29 (listing 
the total net drop in supply of rental unit prices under $800 per month as four million from 
2011–2017). 
 143. See id. at 30 (describing the high proportion of affordable housing rentals in older 
buildings and the associated risk of displacement to residents). 
 144. Id. 
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income demand.145  The National Multifamily Housing Council noted 
that, from 2008 to 2018, less than 3% of new apartments built per year 
were affordable for median-income households.146  With new supply not 
meeting the demand of low- and moderate-income renters, sufficiently 
affordable housing for these renters is increasingly scarce.147  More 
renters have been pushed into higher cost units that are less affordable 
based on their income, but where supply is available.148  As a result of 
this shift, low- and moderate-income renters spend more for housing, 
which has significantly contributed to the increase in cost burden.149   
Several Democrats propose to provide funding to state and local 
governments through grant programs tied to removal of local land-use 
and zoning restrictions that drive up development costs of large 
projects.150  This type of program would not provide direct assistance for 
the construction of housing itself, but rather it seeks to boost supply by 
making construction of new units cheaper and more efficient.151  Modern 
American land-use and zoning restrictions—controlled by state and local 
governments—favor construction of single-family homes.152  The post-
crisis era witnessed a significant population influx to cities and other 
urban areas that challenged local housing markets.153  While rental costs 
increased nationally over recent years,154 costs skyrocketed in markets 
that experienced disproportionate population growth as vacancy rates 
reached record lows.155   
 
 145. Id. at 29–30. 
 146. Id. at 30. 
 147. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., THE GAP: A SHORTAGE OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
3 (2019), https://reports.nlihc.org/sites/default/files/gap/Gap-Report_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EEX4-U7TK]. 
 148. Id. at 5. 
 149. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2 (stating that rental unit vacancy rates near 
historic lows have driven rent price increases at faster rates than many households’ incomes). 
 150. See Passy, supra note 5 (summarizing candidates’ affordable housing proposals). 
 151. See Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing 
Supply, 32 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 6–7 (2018) (discussing the impact of local government land-use 
regulation on the cost of housing construction). 
 152. See Furman, supra note 10, at 7 (describing the development of land-use restrictions 
and the population shift from cities to suburbs). 
 153. See id. at 7 (describing the development of land-use restrictions and the population 
shift from cities to suburbs). 
 154. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that national median rent 
increased 32% between 2001 and 2015, from $512 per month in 2001 to $678 per month in 
2015). 
 155. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 4–5 
(describing the cost burden of renters in the twenty-five highest-cost housing markets). 
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Local zoning laws, with their traditional slant toward single-
family housing, make it more difficult and expensive for new 
development to meet the increased demand caused by the post-crisis shift 
toward urbanization.156  Local governments often promulgate 
ordinances—such as minimum lot sizes, parking requirements, and 
maximum height restrictions—designed to limit population density.157  
These requirements have the effect of limiting new supply of housing 
stock by reducing occupancy limits of multifamily developments, thereby 
decreasing the number of residents accommodated. 158  To satisfy these 
restrictions, developers must build more of these separate, lower capacity 
projects on increasingly expensive and scarce land.159     
By offering subsidies to state and local governments, proponents 
hope to drive down the cost of development to make new construction 
more efficient and economically viable.160  One way to persuade state and 
local governments to choose to participate is to set up competitive grant 
programs to allocate significant federal funding for high-cost 
expenditures like public education and infrastructure development that 
local governments may otherwise struggle to fund on their own.161  As a 
prerequisite to eligibility, the proposals require that state and local 
governments modify certain zoning and land-use restrictions to comply 
with federal guidance.162  Proponents hope that through this quid pro quo 
approach the potential benefits to municipalities will lead them to forego 
their traditional preference for single-family development to make land-
use and zoning restrictions conducive to denser development and more 
efficient, multifamily housing.163 
 
 156. See Furman, supra note 10, at 7 (describing the development of land-use restrictions 
and along with population shift from cities to suburbs). 
 157. Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 151, at 6. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. (describing the negative effect of density restrictions on housing supply). 
 160. See Team Warren, supra note 106 (describing Senator Warren’s proposal for grant 
funding to municipalities aimed at increasing new construction of affordable housing). 
 161. American Housing Economic and Mobility Act (“AHEMA”), S. 787 § 101(c), 116th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2019). 
 162. See id. § 101(d) (describing the requirements for applicants to the proposed grant 
program); Team Warren, supra note 106 (describing Senator Warren’s proposal for grant 
funding to municipalities aimed at increasing new construction of affordable housing). 
 163. See Furman, supra note 10, at 7 (describing the development of land-use restrictions 
and the population shift from cities to suburbs). 
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IV.  ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM 
A. Down Payment Assistance 
Proposed down payment assistance programs would be wide-
reaching, for example, Senator Harris’s proposal could benefit as many 
as four million prospective home buyers,164 but at an estimated $100 
billion cost.165  Down payment assistance is just one component of 
Senator Warren’s proposed American Housing and Economic Mobility 
Act (“AHEMA”).166  The Bill apportions roughly $500 billion167 over ten 
years to a variety of programs designed to increase access to affordable 
housing.168  Proponents claim the AHEMA would be deficit neutral169 
and cite an independent economic analysis performed by Moody’s 
Analytics as confirmation that the Bill’s proposed estate tax changes170 
will offset the $500 billion price tag.171  The Moody’s report found that 
the AHEMA could bolster the economy by adding as many as 1.5 million 
new construction jobs and asserted the estate tax changes would have 
relatively little economic impact as they would not force changes in the 
saving or consumption behavior of those impacted.172  
However, the AHEMA’s nearly $500 billion price tag likely fails 
to include the cost of its down payment assistance program.173  While the 
Bill proposes explicit dollar value appropriations for other programs,174 
 
 164. Siders, supra note 112. 
 165. Combatting the Racial Homeownership Gap, supra note 122. 
 166. See, e.g., AHEMA, S. 787 § 201 (“Down payment assistance program for 
communities formerly segregated by law”); id. § 101 (“Local housing innovation grants.”). 
 167. The AHEMA specifically enumerates appropriations totaling $492.623 billion.  Id. § 
101(f) (appropriating $10 billion); id. § 102(a) (appropriating $445 billion); id. at § 102(b) 
(appropriating $25 billion); id. § 102(c) (appropriating $3.592 billion); id. § 102(d) 
(appropriating $2.5 billion); id. at § 102(e) (appropriating $8 million); id. § 102(f) 
(appropriating $523 million); id. § 102(g) (appropriating $4 billion); id. § 202(c) 
(appropriating $2 billion). 
 168. ZANDI, supra note 3, at 2. 
 169. Team Warren, supra note 106. 
 170. See infra Part IV.B. 
 171. ZANDI, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that AHEMA’s proposed changes to the estate tax 
will offset roughly $400 billion of the bill’s $500 billion price tag while increased economic 
activity will offset the remaining $100 billion). 
 172. Id. 
 173. See American Housing Economic and Mobility Act (“AHEMA”), S. 787 § 201(h), 
116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (proposing a non-specific allocation of funds as necessary to the 
down payment assistance program). 
 174. See, e.g., id. § 102(b) (proposing to allocate $25 billion annually to the Capital 
Management Fund from 2020 through 2029). 
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the AHEMA proposes to allocate “such sums as may be necessary for 
each of fiscal years 2020 through 2029 to provide grants under this 
section and to carry out consumer education efforts related to this 
section” to its down payment assistance program.175  Additionally, the 
AHEMA does not define a precise criteria for the low-income and 
minority-dominated communities of which residency is a prerequisite; 
instead, it calls for the creation of databases and regulations to make these 
determinations.176  Without the data or criteria necessary to determine the 
number of households potentially eligible for assistance under such a 
program, reliable estimates of the total cost and deficit impact are 
unavailable.177 
Beyond the monetary expense, down payment assistance 
programs carry other significant implications for the broader economy.178  
While subsidies alone could put homeownership within reach of some, 
prospective home buyers must still obtain mortgage financing for the rest 
of the purchase price.179  The cost of down payments does prevent many 
low- and moderate-income households from obtaining mortgages,180 but 
those costs are far from the only requirement for mortgage 
qualification.181  For example, poor credit history would prevent many 
renters from obtaining mortgage financing even with down payment 
assistance.182 
Since the collapse of the housing market and 2008 financial crisis, 
lenders generally adhere to more conservative lending practices and show 
 
 175. Id. § 201(h). 
 176. Id. § 201(g). 
 177. See id. § 201(h) (proposing to allocate funds as needed to support the proposed down 
payment assistance program); id. § 201(g) (proposing qualification that criteria and required 
data be determined after passage of the Bill). 
 178. See Damian Paletta, Federal Government Has Dramatically Expanded Exposure to 
Risky Mortgages, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2019, 5:34 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/federal-government-has-dramatically-
expanded-exposure-to-risky-mortgages/2019/10/02/d862ab40-ce79-11e9-87fa-
8501a456c003_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q2J3-D7MJ] (quoting a Fannie Mae regulatory 
filing stating that its efforts to provide credit for purchases of affordable housing has exposed 
it to increased credit risk). 
 179. See URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2, at 4 (describing the inability of some to afford 
homeownership with down payment assistance). 
 180. See generally id. (describing the inability of some to afford homeownership even with 
down payment assistance). 
 181. See id. (describing the role of strict credit standards in preventing access to home 
purchases). 
 182. See id. (stating that while the financial situation of many households whose home 
were foreclosed on during the housing crisis has improved, many are still not deemed 
creditworthy by lenders). 
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a marked aversion to the type of credit risks they embraced in the early 
2000s.183  Government backing is more crucial to the mortgage market 
than ever before, with 65% of all outstanding single-family mortgage 
debt backed by some type of government guarantee.184  As a result, 
lenders overwhelmingly tend to make loans that conform to requirements 
for some type of government backing.185  Indeed, in 2019, the U.S. 
Government backed more mortgage debt than ever before, around $7 
trillion in total.186  The prevalence of FHA insured mortgages increased 
dramatically after the financial crisis, insuring 10.9% of mortgage debt in 
2017, compared to just 3.14% in 2007.187  Private lenders also rely 
heavily on GSE purchases of the mortgage loans they originate as a 
means to offload the associated credit risk and primarily originate loans 
conforming to the GSEs’ purchase standards.188  
While lenders’ growing reliance on government mortgage 
backing is partially attributable to their own post-crisis risk aversion, 
regulatory changes have also contributed to this shift.189  The Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank 
Act”)190 amended the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”)191 to require 
mortgage lenders to make “a reasonable and good faith determination”192 
of prospective borrowers’ “ability to repay” a mortgage on the terms 
provided before extending credit.193  The statutory amendment creates a 
presumption of the borrower’s ability to repay when the lender extends a 
“qualified mortgage.”194  The Dodd-Frank Act designated authority for 
 
 183. See Paletta, supra note 178 (describing increasing rates of FHA insured mortgages). 
 184. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, HOUSING REFORM PLAN: PURSUANT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL 
MEMORANDUM ISSUED MARCH 27, 2019, at 34 (2019), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/Treasury-Housing-Finance-Reform-Plan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RQ79-TDSP]. 
 185. See Paletta, supra note 178 (describing lenders’ conformity to Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac mortgage purchase standards when making loans). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See id. (discussing the Dodd-Frank Act’s requirement that lenders account for 
borrowers’ “ability to repay” a loan). 
 190. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 191. Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968). 
 192. Dodd-Frank § 1411(a)(2), 15 U.S.C § 1639c(b)(1) (2018). 
 193. Id.; see also Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in 
Lending Act (“Regulation Z”), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 1026) (implementing the Dodd-Frank Act’s amendments to TILA). 
 194. Dodd-Frank § 1411(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(1) (2018). 
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the ability-to-repay and qualified mortgage requirements to the newly 
created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”),195 which 
promulgated regulations that went into effect in 2014.196  As part of the 
ability-to-repay determination, the CFPB requires lenders calculate debt-
to-income (“DTI”)197 ratios of prospective borrowers.198  Loans 
originated by private lenders that result in a borrower’s DTI ratio 
exceeding 43% are deemed non-qualified mortgages, resulting in the 
regulatory presumption that the borrower is unable to repay the loan on 
the terms provided.199  Private lenders may still originate non-qualifying 
mortgages but are burdened to establish that they adequately assessed the 
borrower’s ability to repay before originating the loan by examining the 
borrower’s income, assets, employment status, outstanding debts, and 
credit history.200 
Under a CFPB exemption, known as the “GSE patch,”201 loans 
conforming to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac underwriting standards are 
exempt from the typical DTI calculations, and lenders may make 
conforming loans to borrowers with DTI ratios in excess of the 43% 
statutory threshold that are still classified as qualified mortgages with a 
presumption that the borrower is able to repay.202  Loans insured by 
federal agencies such as the FHA, Department of Veterans Affairs 
(“VA”), and Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) are also classified as 
qualified mortgages and are exempt from the DTI calculation under a 
separate regulatory allowance.203  As a result, recently originated 
government-backed mortgages have higher DTI ratios than 
nonconforming or non-federally insured mortgages.204  Indeed, in 2018, 
 
 195. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(“Regulation Z”), 78 Fed. at 6408. 
 196. Id. 
 197. The DTI calculation examines a prospective borrower’s existing monthly debt 
obligations plus the additional payments and fees required as part of the loan sought in 
comparison to total monthly income.  Id. 
 198. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi) (2019). 
 199. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi); Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under 
the Truth in Lending Act (“Regulation Z”), 78 Fed. at 6409. 
 200. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2). 
 201. Id. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii). 
 202. Id. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(A). 
 203. Id. § 1026.43(e)(4)(ii)(B)–(E). 
 204. See KARAN KAUL & LAURIE GOODMAN, WHAT, IF ANYTHING, SHOULD REPLACE THE 
QM GSE PATCH?, at 2 (Urban Inst. 2018), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98949/qualified_mortgage_rule_0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U5G9-Z5T8] (describing higher debt-to-income ratios among government 
backed mortgages compared to bank portfolio mortgages). 
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29% of newly originated Fannie Mae conforming mortgages and 55% of 
FHA insured mortgages were made to borrowers with DTI ratios in 
excess of the CFPB’s 43% threshold currently in place for a private loan 
to be classified as a qualified mortgage.205  The Urban Institute attributes 
this increase in DTI among government-backed mortgages to the faster 
appreciation in home prices in comparison to wages, forcing prospective 
home buyers to borrow more in order to purchase homes at increased 
prices.206   
As home prices continue to appreciate at rates outstripping wage 
growth,207 the low- and moderate-income households—which down 
payment assistance proposals seek to help— would likewise purchase 
homes with higher valuations, requiring larger mortgages that correlate 
to higher DTI ratios for these prospective borrowers.208  Under the 
CFPB’s ability-to-pay requirement, low- and moderate-income 
borrowers rely disproportionately on government-backed mortgages not 
subject to the same debt-to-income calculation thanks to the GSE 
patch.209 CoreLogic data shows that the GSE patch facilitated more than 
$205 billion of mortgages in 2018 to borrowers with DTI ratios exceeding 
43%,210 making up roughly 12.6% of the year’s total mortgage 
originations.211   
The GSE patch was intended as a temporary measure to ensure 
short-term access to mortgage credit while private lenders adjusted to the 
qualified mortgage rule.212  However, since the CFPB implemented the 
ability-to-pay regulation in 2014, lenders have been reticent to issue non-
qualified mortgages largely due to possible regulator and borrower 
retaliation for inadequate verification of the borrower’s ability to repay 
 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. See generally id. (attributing borrowers’ higher debt-to-income ratios to the 
disproportionate growth in home prices over wages). 
 209. See Pradhan, supra note 7 (showing that low- and moderate-income borrowers have 
account for significantly more GSE patch mortgages than high-income borrowers); Paletta, 
supra note 178 (describing the duty of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to ensure access to credit 
to those groups that traditionally have experienced limited access to credit markets). 
 210. See Pete Carroll, Expiration of the CFPB’s Qualified Mortgage “GSE Patch” – Part 
1, CORELOGIC: INSIGHTS BLOG (July 11, 2019), 
https://www.corelogic.com/blog/2019/07/expiration-of-the-cfpbs-qualified-mortgage-gse-
patch-part-1.aspx [https://perma.cc/56YU-RTHG] (showing that 12.6% of the $1.63 trillion 
of mortgages originated in 2018 were facilitated by the GSE patch as the borrowers had DTI 
ratios exceeding 43%). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
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in the event of a default.213  The TILA provides non-qualified mortgage 
borrowers a private right of action against lenders for a violation of the 
ability-to-repay requirement, and they may seek monetary damages or 
use the violation as a defense against foreclosure.214  This private right of 
action also applies to subsequent purchasers of a loan,215 and this 
potential liability makes the purchase of non-qualified mortgages less 
attractive to investors.216   
As a result, the market for private label MBS, which are 
comprised primarily of non-qualified mortgages, is miniscule in 
comparison to before the financial crisis.217  In 2006, private label MBS 
issuance amounted to $1.27 trillion, surpassing the combined value of 
GSE and Ginnie Mae MBS issuance.218  In 2018 by contrast, private label 
MBS amounted to just $181.4 billion, less than 15% of the 2006 value.219  
Since the 2014 implementation of the ability-to-pay requirement, the 
majority of non-qualified mortgages private lenders make to borrowers 
exceeding the 43% DTI threshold are jumbo mortgages220 made to 
financially secure borrowers.221  Jumbo mortgage borrowers tend to have 
higher incomes and are generally more creditworthy than borrowers of 
smaller nonconforming loans, making it easier to establish their ability to 
repay their loans.222  
The existing GSE patch is set to expire in 2021,223 and the CFPB 
currently opposes its extension.224  Without the patch, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac conforming loans resulting in greater than 43% DTI ratios 
 
 213. See KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 3 (discussing the $10-$20 billion per year 
size of the non-qualified mortgage market in comparison to the 1.8 trillion total mortgage 
market annually). 
 214. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (2018); id. § 1640(k). 
 215. Id. § 1640(k). 
 216. U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, supra note 184, at 3. 
 217. Id. 
 218. SEC. INDUS. AND FIN. MKT. ASS’N, supra note 59, tbl.2.1. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Jumbo loans are large mortgages whose values exceed the maximum amount eligible 
for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac purchase.  What Is A Jumbo Loan, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-
jumbo-loan-en-116/ [https://perma.cc/7W53-JMHE]. 
 221. KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 2–3. 
 222. Id. 
 223. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(4)(iii)(B) (2019); Qualified Mortgage Definition under the 
Truth in Lending Act (“Regulation Z”), 84 Fed. Reg. 37155, 37155 (proposed July 25, 2019) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (stating that the CFPB currently plans to allow the GSE 
patch to expire in 2021). 
 224. Qualified Mortgage Definition under the Truth in Lending Act (“Regulation Z”), 84 
Fed. Reg. at 37155 (stating the CFPB currently plans to allow the GSE patch expire in 2021). 
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will be treated as non-qualified mortgages.225  With the looming 
expiration of the GSE patch, mortgage credit for low- and moderate-
income borrowers is likely to contract, even with receipt of down 
payment assistance.226  Lenders will be required to subject prospective 
borrowers to ability-to-repay and debt-to-income analysis, and a violation 
carries the same potential liability which impacted demand for existing 
non-qualified mortgages and could restrict credit to low- and moderate-
income borrowers.227  Under the proposed down payment assistance 
programs, there could be millions more prospective borrowers seeking 
mortgages resulting high debt-to-income ratios.228   
Once the GSE patch expires, two significant sources of mortgage 
funding, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, will likely be unable to serve this 
need on the same scale, because conforming mortgages will be subject to 
more stringent ability-to-repay analysis; those with DTI ratios in excess 
of 43% will be non-qualified.229  The low- and moderate-income 
households that down payment assistance proposals seek to help purchase 
homes are the groups most likely to see mortgage credit restricted with 
the expiration of the GSE patch.230  Potential liability for insufficient 
verification of a borrower’s ability-to-repay imposed on lenders and 
successive owners of non-qualified mortgages has drastically reduced the 
volumes of high DTI non-qualified mortgages originated and investor 
demand for existing non-conforming loans, and this is likely to make high 
DTI conforming loans similarly unattractive to investors.231  Given 
weakened demand for non-qualifying mortgages and the resulting vast 
reduction of the private label MBS market since the financial crisis, 
mortgage credit to low- and moderate-income borrowers is likely to be 
restricted without the GSE patch, severely limiting the efficacy of down 
payment assistance programs.232  
 
 225. KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 3. 
 226. See id. (discussing the possible disruption to the mortgage market when the qualified 
mortgage patch expires in 2021). 
 227. Id. 
 228. See Siders, supra note 112 (stating that the proposed down payment assistance plan 
could impact as many as four million people); KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 2–3. 
 229. See KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 2–3 (discussing the possible disruption to 
the mortgage market when the qualified mortgage patch expires in 2021). 
 230. See Pradhan, supra note 7 (showing that low- and moderate-income borrowers have 
to account for significantly more GSE patch mortgages than high-income borrowers). 
 231. U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 184, at 3. 
 232. KAUL & GOODMAN, supra note 204, at 7 (discussing the possible disruption to the 
mortgage market when the qualified mortgage patch expires in 2021). 
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B. Competitive Grant Programs 
To affect wide-spread land-use and zoning restriction at the 
municipal level, federal grant programs require substantial investment to 
ensure they are able to provide funding sufficient for the types of high-
cost projects state and locals governments struggle to finance 
independently.233  As proposed, Senator Elizabeth Warren’s AHEMA 
includes a provision for this type of grant program and allocates a total of 
$10 billion in funding.234  Funding for a competitive grant program would 
likely come from tax increases, like the substantial changes to the estate 
tax scheme Senator Warren proposes to fund AHEMA.235   
Proponents of the implementing estate tax changes to fund the 
proposal point to the relatively small number of households affected by 
the changes proposed under the AHEMA, noting that rolling back the 
2018 estate tax exemptions to the higher 2009 levels would impact 
roughly 14,000 “high-income” families annually.236  The Bill would 
lower the basic estate tax exclusion to $3.5 million237 from the current 
$10 million exclusion.238  Under the existing tax code, the highest 
marginal estate tax rate is 40% for estates with a taxable value exceeding 
$1 million239  By contrast, the AHEMA adds three new estate tax 
brackets: 55% on estates with taxable values between $1 million and $13 
million, 60% on those valued between $13 million and $93 million, and 
65% on those valued in excess of $93 million.240  In addition, the Bill 
adds a separate241 “billionaires’ surtax” of 10% of the value of an estate 
plus the value of gifts on estates with taxable values exceeding $1 
billion.242 
 
 233. Yglesias, supra note 106. 
 234. American Housing Economic and Mobility Act (“AHEMA”), S. 787 § 101(f), 116th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (proposing to allocate $2 billion per year to grant programs between 
2020 and 2024). 
 235. Id. § 402. 
 236. Team Warren, supra note 106. 
 237. AHEMA, S. 787 § 402(b). 
 238. 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c)(3) (2018). 
 239. Id. § 2001(c). 
 240. AHEMA, S. 787 § 402(a). 
 241. The “billionaires’ surtax” contained in the AHEMA’s estate tax reforms is separate 
from the annual “ultra-millionaire tax” also proposed by Senator Warren.  Ultra-Millionaire 
Tax, WARREN, https://elizabethwarren.com/ultra-millionaire-tax/ [https://perma.cc/275H-
3PXQ] (last visited Oct. 26, 2019). 
 242. AHEMA, S. 787 § 402(c). 
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Supporters of the competitive grant approach point to zoning and 
land-use regulations as an artificial constraint on housing supply.243  
These restrictions replace the normal market forces that lead developers 
to determine how much and what types of housing stock to create with 
regulatory restraints that impede their ability to build the high-density 
housing that can more cost-efficiently meet actual demand.244  With the 
post-crisis decrease in homeownership and the corresponding shift to 
renting, zoning and land-use restrictions targeting multifamily 
developments present especially onerous barriers to adequately meeting 
consumer preferences and needs.245 
Not all observers believe such measures would be effective.246  
Critics suggest that while federal subsidies may accomplish the removal 
of some specific land-use and zoning regulations, they will not achieve 
their overall goal of boosting affordable housing construction.247  
Ultimately, the land-use and zoning regulations that weigh so heavily on 
the cost of developments are within the exclusive purview of local and 
state governments.248  While the federal government may use subsidy 
programs to influence local policymaking, it does not have any direct 
control over local government actions.249  The federal government would 
have little recourse against local governments that remove offensive 
regulations in order to qualify for grant money and subsequently enact 
other restrictions designed to impede construction of affordable housing 
after receiving a grant, thereby honoring the letter but violating the spirit 
of the program.250   
Local control of land-use and zoning restrictions does present an 
additional layer of complexity to a federal government solution,251 but it 
also presents some benefits as well.252  Housing needs and costs vary 
 
 243. Furman, supra note 10. 
 244. See id. (describing zoning and land-use restrictions as a supply constraint). 
 245. See generally Furman, supra note 10 (describing zoning and land-use restrictions as 
an artificial barrier to adequately meeting a market’s housing demand). 
 246. See e.g., Yglesias, supra note 106 (describing the opportunity to remove certain land-
use restrictions to ensure eligibility for grant money while taking other actions to prevent 
development). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Furman, supra note 10, at 7. 
 249. Yglesias, supra note 106. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See Vanessa Brown Calder, Zoning, Land-Use Planning, and Housing Affordability, 
CATO INST. (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/zoning-land-
use-planning-housing-affordability [https://perma.cc/7769-7SSE] (discussing local decisions 
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significantly between markets, making it impossible for a monolithic 
federal policy to meet the particular needs of all areas.253  Competitive 
grant programs will provide powerful incentives for local governments to 
assess their individual housing challenges with a unique understanding of 
the market that a federal agency cannot match.254 
Moreover, removal of costly zoning and land-use restrictions can 
have positive effects on the housing market as a whole, potentially 
lowering costs across all price points.255  Even with eased land-use 
requirements, many developers may continue to focus on higher-cost, 
market-rate housing in order to maximize profit.256  However, additional 
market-rate development has the potential to reduce the costs of low- and 
moderate-cost housing.257  While housing is a long-lived asset, it loses 
value over time and formerly high-end units cannot command the same 
high rents and purchase prices.258  As units age and their rental or 
purchase value diminishes, they naturally shift from higher- to lower-cost 
in a process known as “downward filtering.”259  From 2003 to 2013, 
downward filtering accounted for the majority of additional affordable 
housing rentals nationwide, while the majority of high-cost rentals came 
from new construction.260  Conversely, in the absence of sufficient 
development of market-rate housing or corresponding demand decreases, 
“upward filtering” occurs when owners of existing units improve their 
properties and increase prices to take advantage of the unmet demand for 
more expensive housing.261  Upward filtering is a frequent occurrence in 
 
to remove land-use restrictions as a more efficient means of addressing shortages of affordable 
housing). 
 253. Yglesias, supra note 106. 
 254. Calder, supra note 252. 
 255. See Vicki Been, City Nimbys, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 244 (2018) 
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 256. See ZANDI, supra note 3 (describing developers’ tendency to build high-cost 
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 257. See Christopher Serkin, Divergence in Land Use Regulations and Property Rights, 
92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1067 (2019) (explaining that increased supply of any type of housing 
will likely decrease demand and therefore price for another type of housing within a 
geographic market). 
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(NYU Furman Ctr. 2018), https://furmancenter.org/files/Supply_Skepticism_-_Final.pdf 
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there is new market rate construction in the market). 
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high-cost markets, like the San Francisco Bay Area, where significant 
zoning and land-use restrictions make it cost prohibitive for developers 
to adequately respond to demand for new construction.262  Even if new 
development concentrates on high-cost units, the increased supply of 
these units will accelerate downward filtering of existing units to lower 
price points and satisfy demand of low- and moderate-income 
households.263   
Furthermore, unlike other schemes for direct federal 
subsidization of new construction,264 measures to streamline zoning and 
land-use restrictions have widespread, bipartisan support.265  In 2019, 
President Trump created the White House Council on Eliminating 
Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing to examine zoning and land-
use restrictions that drive up development costs and make 
recommendations to facilitate more cost-effective development.266  
Zoning reform is one of the rare areas today where the Trump 
Administration and Democratic politicians share common ground, and 
their joint support make competitive grant programs a realistic way to 
impact housing affordability.267  
V.  CONCLUSION 
While consistent increases in home prices over the past decade 
place national home prices within striking distance of their 2006 peak,268 
the housing market is fundamentally different today than before the 
financial crisis.269  The unprecedented credit expansion from the 1980s 
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through the early 2000s allowed low- and moderate-income Americans, 
who had previously been unable to access mortgage credit, to purchase 
homes.270  This credit expansion drove home prices to an all-time high 
and effectively created new demand for homeownership from those who 
otherwise would have rented.271  As home prices increased, real estate 
developers boosted construction of new residential housing in an attempt 
to profit from the new demand for homes,272 until the supply of homes 
eventually exceeded demand and prices plummeted in 2007.273 
In contrast to the appreciation of home prices during the early 
2000s, the climb of home values is attributable to insufficient supply 
rather than increased demand for homes.274  Homeownership rates have 
decreased since the 2008 financial crisis, leading to increased demand for 
rental housing and a significant increase in rent prices nationwide.275  
Today, action is needed to address that the costs of both rent and 
homeownership are unaffordable to large numbers of Americans.276 
   Down payment assistance programs could convert existing 
renters into homeowners and provide them with future financial 
prosperity through the accretion of home equity.277  This type of plan 
represents the traditional American policy preference for promoting 
homeownership over renting278 and could help remaining renters by 
shifting some demand out of the rental market into the home purchase 
market.279  While an admirable goal, down payment assistance proposals 
overlook the post-crisis regulation that changed the mortgage market and 
would likely prevent many recipients from qualifying for mortgage 
financing once the GSE patch expires in 2021.280  Providing down 
 
INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 214 (describing the pre-crisis peak rates of 
homeownership). 
 270. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N., supra note 16, at 83 (listing the increase in average 
American household debt from 80% of disposable income in 1993 to roughly 130% in 2006). 
 271. Id. at 214 (describing the 2006 peak of the American housing market). 
 272. See id. at 5 (“Housing starts nationwide climbed 53%, from 1.4 million in 1995 to 
more than 2 million in 2005.”). 
 273. See id. at 389–90 (describing excess housing supply and the effect on housing prices). 
 274. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., supra note 78, at 29–30 
(describing the increasing cost-burden of renters); id. at 2 (describing increase in ratio of 
median home price to median household income). 
 277. Calhoun, supra note 119. 
 278. See Boyack, supra note 22, at 111 (describing the need for rent-friendly policy 
alternatives to typical “American Dream of homeownership” based policies). 
 279. URAHN & PLUNKETT, supra note 2. 
 280. Pradhan, supra note 7. 
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payment assistance could help some low- and moderate-income 
Americans purchase houses, but with entry prices so high, any decrease 
in home prices during an economic downturn could devastate buyers and 
do more harm than good to the people these programs intend to help.281  
Additionally, these plans overlook the fact that significant increases in 
home prices over the past decade make the high monthly payments of a 
mortgage unaffordable to many of the intended recipients,282 which begs 
the question of whether the plans really address housing affordability or 
just promote further homeownership. 
While competitive grant programs tied to zoning reform have 
their drawbacks,283 they seek to remove regulations that prevent housing 
supply from meeting actual demand.284  The number of renters has 
steadily increased since the financial crisis because fewer renters 
purchased homes.285  With the expiration of the GSE patch and the 
potential for a resulting tightening of mortgage credit, home purchases 
could slow and cause rental demand to accelerate even further.286  Given 
the current shortages of both rental and owner-occupancy housing,287 
measures to facilitate denser, more cost-effective construction are 
preferable as they address the specific housing supply challenges the 
nation faces.288  Politicians seeking to address the high cost of housing 
would be better served to focus on solutions like competitive grant 
programs that could improve supply of all types of housing rather than 
those like down payment assistance that look to artificially shift demand 
from one market to another.289 
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